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abstract
The term “social Darwinism” owes its currency and many of its connotations to Richard
Hofstadter’s inﬂuential Social Darwinism in American Thought, 1860–1915 (SDAT). The post-
SDAT meanings of “social Darwinism” are the product of an unresolved Whiggish tension in
SDAT: Hofstadter championed economic reform over free markets, but he also condemned
biology in social science, this while many progressive social scientists surveyed in SDAT
offered biological justiﬁcations for economic reform. As a consequence, there are, in effect,
two Hofstadters in SDAT. The ﬁrst (call him Hofstadter1) disparaged as “social Darwinism”
biological justiﬁcation of laissez-faire, for this was, in his view, doubly wrong. The sec-
ond Hofstadter (call him Hofstadter2) documented, however incompletely, the underside
of progressive reform: racism, eugenics and imperialism, and even devised a term for it,
“Darwinian collectivism.” This essay documents and explains Hofstadter’s ambivalence in
SDAT,especiallywhere,aswithProgressiveEraeugenics,the“twoHofstadters”wereatodds
with each other. It explores the historiographic and semantic consequences of Hofstadter’s
ambivalence, including its connection with the Left’s longstanding mistrust of Darwinism
as apology for Malthusian political economy.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Political economy and biology are trading partners of long standing. Charles Darwin wrote frequently of the economy of
nature, and he famously acknowledged the inﬂuence of T.R. Malthus’ Essay on Population upon his formative thinking, as did
the co-founder of the theory of evolution by natural selection, Alfred Russel Wallace. Theories of organic evolution have long
attracted economists.1
Evolutionary ideas were especially widespread among Progressive Era social scientists. Veblen (1899), for example, pro-
posed that economics be reconstructed upon Darwinian principles. Marshall, whose Principles frontispiece recorded the
same motto found in The Origin of Species (1859), natura non facit saltum, opined that “the Mecca of the economist lies in evo-
lutionary biology” (1920, p. 19).2 Writing in 1894, Wharton School reformer Simon Patten said: “The great scientiﬁc victories
of the nineteenth century lie in the ﬁeld of biology.... We are closing this century with as deﬁnite a bias in favor of biologic
reasoning and analogy as the last century closed with a similar bias in favor the method of reasoning used in physics and
astronomy” (1894, p. 68). Moreover, a Who’s Who of Progressive Era political economy appealed to eugenics (planned social
control of human heredity) to justify the economic reform legislation so characteristic of the time (Leonard, 2003).
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1 See Geoffrey Hodgson’s introductory essay and the papers he has gathered in The Foundations of Evolutionary Economics, 1890–1973 (1998).
2 On the use of biology analogies in Marshall, see Niman (1991).
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Today Darwinism enjoys enormous prestige and inﬂuence, arguably more than at any time since the publication of
the Origin of Species,y e tsocial Darwinism, in marked contrast, today functions as an omnibus term of abuse, enough that
essentially no one has ever self-applied the term.
This essay inquires into the implied historical puzzle: how is it that “social Darwinism,” which should refer neutrally to
the application of Darwinian ideas to society, has instead come to be an indictment? Moreover, if social Darwinism is, as
everyone knows, a Bad Thing (Bannister, 1988, p. 3), what manner of Bad Thing?3 How, in particular, did “social Darwinism”
come to denote free-market opposition, especially that of Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner, to progressive
reform, the planned state intervention into economy and society?
This essay will argue that “social Darwinism” owes both its contemporary currency and its association with laissez-
faire to Hofstadter’s (1944) brilliant and inﬂuential ﬁrst book, Social Darwinism in American Thought, 1860–1915 (SDAT).
Hofstadter’s ﬁrst take on Progressive Era reform was, as he later admitted, refracted through a New Deal liberal’s conception
of reform (Foner, 1992, p. xxii), one that did not share the biologically rooted enthusiasms—eugenics, scientiﬁc racism and
race-conscious imperialism—of the Progressive Era reformers who are the primary focus of Hofstadter’s book. The post-
Hofstadter meaning of “social Darwinism” is, in part, the product of an unresolved Whiggish tension in SDAT: Hofstadter
transparently championed state-guided progressive reform, what he called “meliorism,” but he also condemned biology in
social science, this while leading Progressive Era progressives championed both.
As a consequence, one ﬁnds in SDAT an incipient ambivalence toward Progressive Era reformers, whose reformism Hof-
stadter applauds, but whose sometime support for eugenics, racism and imperialism, he rejects. There are, in effect, two
Hofstadters present in SDAT. The ﬁrst (call him Hofstadter1) can safely disparage biological justiﬁcation of laissez-faire, for
this was, in his view, doubly wrong. It is this Hofstadter who attached the epithet “social Darwinism” to biological justiﬁ-
cation of free markets and who offered an account that, as Bellomy (1984, p. 27) put it, depicted “heroic liberals snatching
helpless social science from the clutches of vile Social Darwinists.”
But SDAT, however much it caricatured the free-market economics of Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner, also
documented the inﬂuence of Darwinian and other evolutionary ideas upon some of those “heroic liberals”, the progres-
sives who led the assault upon free-market economics. The second Hofstadter (call him Hofstadter2) documented, however
incompletely, the underside of progressive reform: racism, eugenics and imperialism. Hofstadter2 even distinguished what
he called “collectivist Darwinism” from the “individualist Darwinism” of Spencer and Sumner, and concluded that, “intrin-
sically, [Darwinism] was a neutral instrument, capable of supporting opposite ideologies” (1944, p. 174). “If there were, in
Darwin’s writings, texts for rugged individualists,” wrote Hofstadter2, “those who stood for social solidarity and fraternity
could, however, match them text for text with some to spare” (1944, p. 74).
Hofstadterin1944preferredplanningtolaissez-faireandhepreferredculturaltobiologicalexplanationsinsocialscience.
When planning was itself biological, as it was with Progressive Era eugenics, for example, the two Hofstadters were at odds
with each other, with consequences for the future fortunes of the term “social Darwinism.” This essay argues for Hofstadter’s
ambivalence (by personifying the two Hofstadters) in SDAT, and explores its consequences, including, lastly, its connection
with the Left’s longstanding mistrust of Darwinism as apology for Malthusian political economy.
2. The Whiggish tension in SDAT
Richard Hofstadter, like many New York intellectuals in the 1930s, embraced radical reform. He joined Columbia Univer-
sity’s Communist Party unit for a brief period in 1938. The more mature Hofstadter grew disenchanted with radical politics,
indeed came to see it as hostile to scholarship, but SDAT, which revised his doctoral dissertation published in 1939, preserves
Hofstadter’s earlier world view, that of a precocious scholar, still much inﬂuenced by his mentors, Merle Curti and Charles
Beard, who could say to close friends, “I hate capitalism and everything that goes with it” (Foner, 1992, p. xi). SDAT also
bears the historiographic imprint of Beard’s “rule” that historical interpretation must assume that “changes in the structure
of social ideas wait on general changes in economic and social life” (1944, p. 176). SDAT is thus sprinkled with unadorned
Beardian claims, such as “Herbert Spencer and his philosophy were products of English Industrialism” (1944, p. 22).
Time did not much soften Hofstadter’s hostility to free markets. In The Age of Reform (1955, p. 18) Hofstadter maintained
that“theAmericansystem...attimesandinplaceswasajungle.”TheyoungHofstadter,whobeganunderCurti’ssupervision
in 1939, wrote as a garden-variety 1930s American intellectual of the liberal/Left. His hostility to Progressive Era defenders
of competitive individualism was a given in his intellectual milieu, transparent even to sympathetic reviewers. One friendly
review noted that “Dr. Hofstadter’s own sympathies are not hard to divine: he is hostile to laissez-faire, to Spencerian
sociology,toclassicaleconomics”(D.W.B.,1946,p.124).EricFoner,HofstadterstudentandsuccessorinhischairatColumbia,
was equally plain in his introduction to the book’s 1992 printing: “Hofstadter makes no effort to disguise his distaste for the
socialDarwinistsorhissympathyforthecritics,especiallythesociologistsandphilosopherswhobelievedintellectualscould
guide intellectual progress (a view extremely congenial to Hofstadter at the time he was writing)” (p. xv). The Hofstadter of
SDATwroteasanopponentoflaissez-faireandalsoasachampionofwhathetooktobeitsrightfulsuccessor,planned,expert-
led reform. But Hofstadter’s view of the Progressive Era reformers, whose opposition to laissez faire he had celebrated in
SDAT, darkened over time, moving ever farther from the near-hagiographic portraits offered by other historians of American
3 Bannister, a leading revisionist of Hofstadter, is using “Bad Thing” ironically.T.C. Leonard / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71 (2009) 37–51 39
thought such as Curti and Henry Steele Commager. A decade after SDAT, Hofstadter could say plainly that “the progressive
movementhadanambiguouscharacter”andthat“somewherealongtheway,alargepartofthePopulist-Progressivetradition
has turned sour, become illiberal and ill-tempered” (1955, pp. 18, 20). The Hofstadter of The Age of Reform distanced mid-
century American reform from its Progressive Era antecedents. “The Spirit of the progressive era was quite different from
that of the New Deal,” he wrote (1955, p. 20). It could even be said that, the more mature Hofstadter suggested, “hatred of
Europe and Europeans, racial, religious, and nativist phobias ...all these have been found not only in opposition to reform
but at times oddly combined with it” (1955, pp. 20–21).4
The New Deal liberals shared with their progressive ancestors opposition to free-market economics, but as the more
mature Hofstadter argued, Progressive Era reform differed importantly from New Deal reform. New Deal liberals, unlike
the progressives, were not hostile to machine politicians and instead formed alliances with them. The “German model” of
progressive reform, Bismarkian social welfarism, was, after WWI, untenable politically, and the Left abandoned Germany for
a new exemplar, the Soviet Union. New Deal liberals also abandoned the progressive ethos of human improvement and its
distinctly moralizing language. Most important of all for our purposes, New Deal liberalism in the early years of the Second
World War would no longer easily accommodate the biologically grounded thought, such as eugenics, scientiﬁc racism and
race-inspired imperialism, that some leading progressives championed in the Progressive Era.
Reform attitudes toward biology in social science experienced a sea change in the 40 years that separated Theodore
Roosevelt’s election to the presidency and the publication of SDAT. The decline of American eugenics in the 1930s and 1940s
was only one part of the increasing hostility, especially on the political Left, to the use of biology more generally in the social
sciences.5 The upshot was that Hofstadter believed, like many others circa 1941, that biological explanations of human action
andhumansocietywereillegitimateanddangerous.GoingevenfurtherthanColumbiaUniversityanthropologistFranzBoas,
whohadarguedthatculturemorethannaturedeterminedtheshapeofhumanityandsociety,Hofstadterarguedthatbiology
was irrelevant to human social life (1944, p. 176). SDAT’s ringing peroration condemned “such biological ideas as ‘survival
of the ﬁttest”’ as being of “doubtful value in natural science,” and as being “utterly useless in attempting to understand
society” (1944, p. 176). For the idea that biology alone explained human action, what Hofstadter condemned as biological
determinism, he proposed to substitute the opposite extreme, cultural determinism, the idea that biology has nothing to do
with human action.
Hofstadter’s(1944)NewDealleft-liberalsensibilitythuscontainedtwointellectualposits:ﬁrst,thatstate-plannedreform
was socially, economically and ethically better than free markets, and second, that biological, especially Darwinian expla-
nations of human society were illegitimate and dangerous.6 But this reform-good-biology-bad trope, while characteristic
of Hofstadter’s mid-20th century American liberalism, does not map upon the Gilded Age and Progressive Era analyzed in
SDAT.7 In particular, it ill-suited the progressive scholars who were the real focus of SDAT and who were happy to harness
biological (including Darwinian) arguments for their various reform ends. In fact, the Progressive Era progressives Hofstadter
most admired (men like Lester F. Ward, Edward A. Ross, Thorstein Veblen, Charles Horton Cooley, and John R. Commons)
were enthusiastic biologizers.
These two aspects of the more mature Hofstadter’s thought, contempt for free-market economics but skepticism regard-
ing the biological explanations of progressives who would substitute expert planning for free markets, are both present in
SDAT. However, Hofstadter1’s contempt for free markets was far more developed than Hofstadter2’s still incipient skepti-
cism regarding progressivism, an asymmetry that had consequences for the subsequent fate of “social Darwinism” in social
science.
3. Social Darwinism and “social Darwinism”
Hofstadter declared American social Darwinism dead no later than 1918: “as a conscious social philosophy,” Hofstadter
said, “social Darwinism had disappeared in America at the end of the war” (1944, p. 175). It is an irony, then, that the term
“social Darwinism” gained meaningful currency only with the book that declared the concept long dead. Historians revising
Hofstadter have established that both the term “social Darwinism” and the concept of social Darwinism are unexpectedly
rare in the 1860–1915 period surveyed by SDAT.
4 “One of the most interesting and least studied aspects of American life,” Hofstadter continued, “has been the frequent recurrence of the demand for
reforms ...combined with the choice of hatred as a kind of creed” (1955, p. 21).
5 Hodgson (2004), for example, singles out Talcott Parsons as especially inﬂuential in purging American sociology, long informed by biology, of its
biological orientation. In keeping with the tradition of using “social Darwinism” as an epithet, Parsons used “social Darwinism” to disparage any uses of
biology in sociology, Darwinian or other.
6 “ThetraditionofProgressivereformistheoneuponwhichIwasreared,”saidHofstadterin1955,“anduponwhichmypoliticalsentimentswereformed,
as is indeed the tradition of most intellectuals in America” (1955, p. 21).
7 Hofstadter treated social Darwinism as “a phase in the history of conservative thought,” but his exemplary social Darwinists, Herbert Spencer and
William Graham Sumner, were classical liberals, not conservatives. Spencer was considered dangerously radical in the early postbellum years. Before the
Progressive Era professionalization of American economics, Spencer’s anticlerical and antideistic stances were quite controversial in American colleges,
which were institutionally Christian and where clerics taught political economy. This was especially true at Yale, where Sumner’s introduction into the
curriculum of Spencer’s Study of Sociology was opposed by President Noah Porter. Sumner challenged Porter on grounds of academic freedom (see Barber,
1988, pp. 147–151).40 T.C. Leonard / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71 (2009) 37–51
First, the term “social Darwinism.”8 Bannister (1988) and Bellomy (1984) established that “social Darwinism” was all
but unknown to English-speaking readers before the Progressive Era. Hodgson’s (2004) bibliometric analysis identiﬁed a
mere eleven instances of “social Darwinism” in the Anglophone literature (as represented by the JSTOR database) before
1916.9 Before 1916 “social Darwinism” had almost no currency whatsoever, so it was, essentially, an anachronism as used by
Hofstadter in SDAT.
“SocialDarwinism”didnotacquiremuchgreatercurrencybetween1916and1943;amere49articlesandreviewsemploy
the term.10 Following the publication of SDAT, however, “social Darwinism” goes from obscure to commonplace: there are
4258 citations from 1944 to the present.11
The fact that social Darwinism is anachronistic when applied to the pre-1916 period does not prove, of course, that
the substance SDAT meant to characterize did not exist, but anachronism should put us on our guard, and Hofstadter’s
revisionists, most prominently Bannister (1973, 1988), have persuasively argued that, SDAT notwithstanding, Darwinist
defenses of laissez-faire were, like the term “social Darwinism” itself, quite uncommon in the American Gilded Age and
Progressive Era.
As Bannister (1988) and Bellomy (1984) detail, “social Darwinism” had Continental not Anglo-American origins, and, its
convoluted semantic history notwithstanding, more commonly referred to competition among groups (nations or races)
than to competition among individuals within a group. The rare uses of “social Darwinism” before SDAT ordinarily referred
to the uses of biology to defend militarism and war. Importantly, “social Darwinism” was applied to Spencer only twice
before SDAT, and the ﬁrst use of the term to describe Sumner appears in Hofstadter’s 1941 publication “William Graham
Sumner: Social Darwinist.” In short, though the epithet “social Darwinist” is today more closely associated with Sumner and
Spencer than with any other writers, that association was all but non-existent before Hofstadter published SDAT (Hodgson,
2004, pp. 447–448).
“SocialDarwinism”hadalwaysbeenanepithet.Fromitsverybeginnings,remindsBellomy(1984,p.2),“socialDarwinism”
has been “heavily polemical, reserved for ideas with which a writer disagreed.” In SDAT Hofstadter continued the tradition of
deploying“socialDarwinism”todisparage,but,asBellomypointedout,“historianshavenotalwaysdislikedthesamethings”
(1984, p. 2). Hofstadter, an American liberal writing at Columbia University during the nadir of American capitalism, disliked
laissez-faire, and he disliked biological explanations of human action. In Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner he
found two men who seemed to epitomize both aspects of what Hofstadter most disliked.
4. Indicting free-market economics as “social Darwinism”
Hofstadter argued in SDAT that American businessmen found in Darwin a convenient defense for their defenses of free
markets. “Successful business entrepreneurs,” said Hofstader, “seemed to have accepted almost by instinct the Darwinian
terminology which had emerged from the conditions of their existence” (1944, p. 30). But American businessmen who
invoked Darwin to defend the Gilded Age economic order were, it turns out, scarcer than hen’s teeth (Wyllie, 1959). Many
businessmen were prepared to oppose reform and to justify laissez-faire, but their defenses of laissez-faire much more
commonly invoked religion, the common good, Horatio Alger mythology, the American republican tradition, and even, if
less frequently, classical political economy. As historian Wilson (1967, p. 93) put it, “It is true that in the last half of the
19th century great numbers of Americans were ideologically committed to the notions of competition, merited success and
deservedfailure.ButitisnottruethatthiscommitmentwasgroundedonDarwinianpremises.Nomorethanasmallhandful
of American business leaders or intellectuals were ‘social Darwinists’ in any sense precise enough to have a useful meaning.”
Darwiniandefensesoflaissez-faireamongscholars,whoweremorelikelytohavereadDarwin,arenotmucheasiertoﬁnd.
Bannister and other revisionists point out that even Hofstadter’s social Darwinist exemplars Herbert Spencer and William
GrahamSumnerwerenotespeciallyDarwinist.Spencercertainlyinvokedtheevolutionaryadvantagesofcompetitionamong
men, and his extraordinary intellectual prominence in the last third of the 19th century also made him a large target for
reform scholars. But Spencer would have rejected the label of “Darwinist,” in part because his own theory of evolution
differed from and was published before Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (Spencer, 1852). The catch-phrase “survival of the
ﬁttest” was Spencer’s, and Darwin did not adopt it as a synonym for “natural selection” until Alfred Russel Wallace convinced
him to do so in the ﬁfth edition of the Origin (1869).
Importantly, Spencer was a Lamarckian with respect to human inheritance. He imagined that competition induced
human beings to adapt themselves actively to their environments, improving their mental and physical skills, improved
8 Scholars have located the ﬁrst appearance of the term “social Darwinism” in an 1879 article in Popular Science by Oscar Schmidt (Bellomy, 1984;
Bannister, 1988; Crook, 1996; Hodgson, 2004). I have identiﬁed an 1877 use of the term by Joseph Fisher in “A History of Landholding in Ireland,” published
in the Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. Future scholars will no doubt unearth still earlier citations.
9 These few citations of social Darwinism (and also “social Darwinian” and “social Darwinist” and plural forms) are out of a search space containing over
203,000 articles and reviews. Nor is it a question of the currency of “Darwinism.” If we remove only the modiﬁer “social,” and then perform the identical
search, JSTOR produces 1188 instances of “Darwinism” (and “Darwinian” and “Darwinist”), the earliest example being used in 1863 in a review of Thomas
Henry Huxley’s Man’s Place in Nature.
10 Of 53 cites, one is a duplicate and two are notices of Hofstadter’s dissertation. Another is Hofstadter’s “William Graham Sumner, Social Darwinist,”
which later appeared as a chapter in SDAT. There were but 29 articles published using social Darwinism (and like forms) from 1916 to 1943, one of them by
Hofstadter, or about one citation per year. The JSTOR search space of articles and books for 1916–1943 was over 216,000.
11 As of 31 May 2007. The search space for 1944 to 31 May 2007 comprised 2,475,225 articles and reviews.T.C. Leonard / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71 (2009) 37–51 41
traits that would then be inherited by to their descendants. Spencer’s view was that, in the struggle for existence, self-
improvement came from conscious, planned exertion, not from the chance variation and natural selection that are the heart
of Darwinism.12 As a result, evolution is progressive in Spencer, whereas, for Darwin, at least the early Darwin, evolution
means only non-teleological change. Spencer’s fundamental belief in human progress via Lamarckian bootstrapping was at
odds with Darwinian natural selection’s randomness and its openness to non-progressive change.
Spencer, in fact, was not just a Lamarckian, he was a leading Lamarckian, taking up cudgels against the neo-Darwinians
suchasbiologistAugustWeismann,whosewatershedﬁndingin1889,thatmicewiththeirtailscutoffdonotbearshort-tailed
progeny, was seen by many as a crucial-experiment refutation of Lamarckism. Spencer’s status as a defender of Lamarckism
in the 1890s was such that that progressive Lamarckians, such as Lester Frank Ward, often found themselves in the awkward
of position defending Spencer, a man whose individualism and laissez-faire economics they loathed (Degler, 1991, p. 22).
Sumner, like Spencer, was a strenuous advocate of individualism and economic competition. But, also like Spencer, he
never used the term “social Darwinism” in all his writings, and Darwin ﬁgures surprisingly rarely in Sumner’s oeuvre.
One can ﬁnd Sumner defending millionaires as the product of natural selection, for example, but Sumner’s laissez-faire
pronouncementsareonlypatchilyupholsteredwithDarwiniansentiments(Bannister,1973).Hodgson(2004,p.432)reports
that in his most important treatise, Folkways (1906), Sumner mentioned Darwin only once.13 Sumner’s student and executor,
Albert Galloway Keller, lamented that his teacher “did not give much attention to the possibility of extending evolution into
the societal ﬁeld” (cited in Hodgson, 2004, p. 432).
Sumnerwasaself-styleddefenderofthecommon(or“forgotten”)man:heregardednotjustsocialismbutalsoplutocracy
as an evil. Socialism and plutocracy were, for Sumner, equally bad forms of social control. It was Sumner’s hostility to
plutocracy that lead him to attack the Republican Party in 1909, accusing it of acquiring “the character of a conspiracy to hold
power and to use it for plutocratic ends” (Sumner, 1911a, p. 160). Writing a new introduction to SDAT in 1959, Hofstadter,
whose SDAT framing of Sumner as conservative could not accommodate Sumner’s opposition to the Republican status quo,
can offer only a witticism: “we may wonder whether in the entire history of thought, there ever was a conservativ[e] so
utterly progressive as this” (Hofstadter, 1992,p .8 ) .
Sumner also demonstrated his laissez-faire bona ﬁdes when he opposed the tariff, a decidedly non-conservative apostasy
(Bannister, 1973). Sumner was an advocate for laissez-faire, not for industry, and when industry beneﬁted from policies
opposed to laissez-faire, such as the tariff, Sumner was their enemy. The point here is obvious, but often lost in the stark
dichotomiesofProgressiveErahistoriography:notalldeparturesfromlaissez-fairewillservethecauseofprogressivereform;
indeed, they can work to entrench the status quo that reform seeks to change.
Howard Kaye, a careful scholar of social Darwinism, summarizes the historiography that revises Hofstadter: “a close
reading of the theories of Sumner and Spencer exonerates them from the century-old charge of social Darwinism in the
strictest sense of the term. They themselves did not advocate the application of Darwin’s theory of natural selection, ‘the law
of the jungle,’ to human society” (Kaye, 1986, pp. 33–34).
So what are Spencer and Sumner doing in a volume entitled “Social Darwinism in American Thought”? The answer, of
course, is that Hofstadter is using “social Darwinist” in the traditional way: as an epithet to discredit views he opposed. What
is new in the Anglophone literature is Hofstadter’s applying the term to free-market economics.
Hofstadter put Spencer and Sumner in the dock less for their putative use of Darwinian ideas than for their defense of
economic competition and individualism. As much as Hofstadter rejected biological ideas in social thought, his primary
quarrel was with competitive individualism, a position he never abandoned, however much his views of progressivism
darkened over time. Like the progressives who had viliﬁed Spencer and Sumner, Hofstadter judged the American Gilded Age
economic order a jungle and therefore judged any defense of it as “Darwinist,” whatever its particulars.
As Bannister has argued, the emotional power of the epithet “social Darwinist” comes less from the theoretical claim that
theallegedsocialDarwinisthasmisappropriatedDarwinism(i.e.,hasgotDarwinwrong)thanitdoesfromthechargethatthe
alleged social Darwinist has wrongly apologized for power and privilege (1988, p. xvii), where, in the Gilded Age, power and
privilege were assumed to reside with the plutocratic captains of industry and not (yet) with the captains of the ship of state.
5. Hofstadter1: free markets versus the managed society
That even Hofstadter’s social Darwinist exemplars fail to be especially Darwinist has led some scholars to suggest that
a more accurate term for what Hofstadter meant to describe is “social Spencerism” (Ruse, 1980), that is, the view that the
state should not intervene in markets, but should let “nature” take its course. Several of SDAT’s ﬁrst reviewers recognized this
aspectofSDAT:Hofstadter’ssocialDarwinism,wroteHaroldLarrabeeinEthics,“isperhapsseven-tenthsHerbertSpencerism”
(1946, p. 151). A reviewer identiﬁed as “D.W.B” wrote “it is less Darwinism than Spencerism that is the theme” (1946, p. 123).
Part of the interpretative difﬁculty is that Hofstadter himself was unclear on what he meant by “social Darwinism,” a term
with little currency before 1944. In the preface, he staked out a very general deﬁnition: “the adaptation of Darwinism and
related biological concepts to social ideologies” (1944, p. vii). Later in the text, he referred to an even more expansive “bio-
logically derived social speculation” (1944, p. 74). When he wished to condemn, as in SDAT’s summation, Hofstadter reduced
12 Thus could Spencer write an extended two-part paper on “The Inadequacy of Natural Selection” (1893).
13 In fact, Sumner mentions Darwin a few times in Folkways, but the point remains.42 T.C. Leonard / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71 (2009) 37–51
social Darwinism to “survival of the ﬁttest” doctrine. In Hofstadter’s 1959 introduction to SDAT, Hofstadter retrospectively
characterized SDAT as an inquiry into “the effect of Darwin’s work upon social thinking in America,” though there is, in fact,
very little of Darwin’s work considered in SDAT (1992, p. 4).
As these varying deﬁnitions suggest, Hofstadter in SDAT sometimes ran together Darwinism with evolutionary ideas
more generally. One cause of Hofstadter’s conﬂation was his early-1940s view that biological explanations (Darwinian and
other) of society were illegitimate, full stop. However, the Hofstadter schema that opposed biological with non-biological
(read: cultural) explanations in social science, applied to the 1860–1915 era, had very little cutting power. With the notable
exception of Franz Boas and his school, very few of the writers SDAT surveyed could be placed on the non-biological (read:
cultural) side of this dichotomy.
The stronger divide in SDAT is not, then, between those who used Darwinian (or other evolutionary) ideas to defend their
social scientiﬁc claims and their critics who did not. The stronger divide in SDAT, the schema with greater cutting power,
is Hofstadter’s opposition between laissez-faire (individualism) and economic reform (collectivism). SDAT begins with the
advocates of individualism and economic competition, Spencer and Sumner. The rest of the book is taken up with their
reform critics. Thus, whether or not we judge “Darwinist” to be an accurate modiﬁer, did Hofstadter oppose “Darwinist
individualism” to “Darwinist collectivism.”
Spencer and Sumner are, of course, the defenders of laissez-faire. Hofstadter devotes an entire chapter to only one other
ﬁgure,“LesterFrankWard:Critic,”andSDATpivotsonthischapter.Butcriticofwhat?True,WardwasnofriendofDarwinism.
HealsowasavigorouscriticofSpencerandSumner,onwhomHofstadterhungtheepithet“socialDarwinist.”However,Ward
did not criticize Spencer and Sumner because they had wrongly appropriated Darwinian ideas in defense of laissez-faire,
for Spencer and Sumner were not, we have seen, especially Darwinist. In fact, Ward explicitly rejected the use of “social
Darwinism” as a synonym for their free-market economics. Ward (1907a, p. 292) said plainly,
I have never seen any distinctively Darwinian principle appealed to in discussions of ‘social Darwinism.’ It is therefore
wholly inappropriate to characterize as social Darwinism the laissez faire doctrine of political economists .... That
laissez faire doctrine is false and not sustained by biological principles I freely admit and have abundantly shown, but
the fallacy involved is to be found in an entirely different department of scientiﬁc investigation.
Therefore, though Ward was a critic of (aspects of) Darwinism and also of laissez-faire, his two critiques were distinct,
and it is Ward’s critique of laissez-faire, I argue, that has primacy in the analytical structure of SDAT. Ward, after all, was not
a critic of “biologically derived social speculation,” to use Hofstadter’s more expansive deﬁnition of social Darwinism. To the
contrary,itwasWardwhoinsistedinhiscritiqueofSumnerthatallsociologistsshouldbebiologists(Hofstadter,1944,p.63).
The younger Ward (1891) had ﬂirted with eugenics,14 and Ward defended a theory of race conﬂict (originally promulgated
by the Austrian sociologists Ludwig Gumplowicz and Gustav Ratzenhofer) as an explanation of progressive social evolution.
In 1906, Ward explained race conﬂict theory as the “sociological homologue of natural selection” (1907b, p. 585). Even when
Jacques Novicow called Ward a social Darwinist because Novicow regarded race-conﬂict theory a wrongful defense of war,
Ward denied the charge but did not retreat from race-conﬂict theory.15
Hofstadter (1944, p. 62) acknowledged (some of) Ward’s history, but dismissed it, insisting that Ward’s theory of race
conﬂict“foundbutasmallplaceinhiswork.”Ward,however,inathree-partarticlesurveyingcontemporarysociology,wrote
that “doctrine of the struggle of races,” was the most important subject in sociology. The struggle of the races, Ward averred,
“forms so large a part of my own conception of sociology that it will be necessary to deal with it extensively elsewhere”
(1902, p. 759). He dealt with it principally in Pure Sociology (1903, p. 238), where he said ﬂatly, “war has been the chief and
leading condition of human progress” and that “when races stop struggling progress ceases”. The point is less to enter into
the scholarly debate about the inﬂuence of biology upon Ward’s social science or the centrality of race-conﬂict theory to
Ward’s sociology. The point is more to argue that in SDAT, the “critic” Ward functions more as a critic of laissez-faire than as a
critic of the use of biology in social sciences per se. Ward, moreover, served in SDAT not only as an opponent of individualism
and economic competition, but also as the champion of the “managed society,” what Hofstadter called the “conscious and
directed change of society” (1992, p. 7).
Beginning with the end of the Depression years, mid-20th century American historians rediscovered Ward as a sem-
inal progressive thinker. Chugerman (1939) wrote a book entitled Lester Frank Ward: The American Aristotle. Henry Steele
Commager (Ward, 1967) later celebrated Ward as the rightful architect of the American welfare state. Hofstadter likewise
depicted Ward as a “forerunner of social planning,” a pioneer “who preached a planned society,” and who was a “champion
of the masses” (1944, pp. 55–66).
Ward’s theory fundamentally distinguished “telic” phenomena, those governed by human will or purpose, from “genetic”
phenomena, those that are the product of random natural forces. When Ward said that “the fundamental principle of biology
14 In his 1891 presidential address to the Biological Society of Washington, Ward suggested that the “crime of perpetuating the least taint of hereditary
disease, insanity or other serious defect” could and ultimately would be prevented by “a practical and successful stirpiculture,” using an earlier term for
eugenics. Said Ward, “artiﬁcial selection has given to man the most that he possesses of value in the organic products of the earth. May not men and women
be selected as well as sheep and horses? ...At least we should by a rigid selection stamp out of the future all the wholly unworthy elements” (in Ward,
1913, p. 739).
15 This story, especially Ward’s tortuous attempts to reconcile race-conﬂict theory with his opposition to Darwinism, is well told in Bellomy (1984, pp.
54–63).T.C. Leonard / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71 (2009) 37–51 43
is natural selection, [and] that of sociology is artiﬁcial selection,” he was not making a eugenic argument as such; he was
defending his view that natural and social evolution were different and that society could (and should) direct its own social
evolution.16
The critics of reform, read through Ward’s dichotomy, thought of society as governed by “genetic” phenomena: social
change is the product of “the planless outcome of random variations,” not of social intervention (1944, p. 64). What is more,
social evolution, like natural evolution, was slow and gradual. This is what Hofstadter means when he refers to the “cold
determinism of Spencer’s philosophy” (1944, p. 85).17 The progressive proponents of reform, in contrast, regarded social
evolution as “telic,” amenable to human purpose, in particular, amenable to planned social control of markets. “Man’s task
is not to imitate the laws of nature,” wrote Hofstadter, “but to observe them, appropriate them, direct them” (1992, p. 74).
A key distinction here concerns the appropriate unit of theoretical account. In the Progressive Era, progressive reformers
abandoned classically liberal individualism, which was characteristic not just of anti-statists such as Spencer and Sumner,
but also of the Mugwumps, the Gilded Age reform precursors of progressivism. Ward pioneered the American progressive
emphasis on the nation or state or society as the rightful unit of theoretical account, the holism that Hofstadter called
“solidarism.” The progressive emphasis on social control required more than purpose, after all, for Spencer’s Lamarckian
self-help was nothing if not purposeful. It also required a view that a collective, be it nation or state or society, could have
purposesorinterestsbeyondthoseofitsindividualmembers.“Purposefulactivitymusthenceforthberecognizedasaproper
function not only of the individual,” read Hofstadter’s gloss on Ward, “but of the whole society” (1944, p. 64).
In practice, the overarching Progressive Era question for political economy was what the relationship of the state to the
economy should be. SDAT located on one side of the divide the progressive defenders of reform, who, as pioneered by Ward,
saw collective welfare as best promoted by state economic experts who would direct improvement of human society. On
the other side SDAT placed the proponents of free-market economics, who denied the existence of social interests beyond
those of the individuals who constitute society and who saw voluntary exchange rather than social planning as the source
of economic well being. Just as Ward the “critic” was a critic of free-market economics, so too were progressives given the
title of “dissenters” in SDAT’s chapter six. Their dissent was not to “biologically derived social speculation,” for many were
enthusiastic biologizers, but to laissez-faire.
Lookingbackfromtheearly1940s,whentheNewDealhadalreadyradicallytransformedtherelationshipoftheAmerican
state to the economy and when the United States government was planning economic production to increase output for the
war effort, Hofstadter declared victory for planning and collectivism over free markets and individualism. “The managed
society which Ward had anticipated and which Sumner had so stoutly opposed,” wrote Hofstadter, “was becoming a reality.”
“Despite the interruption of the twenties,” Hofstadter continued, “the trend toward social cohesion kept growing” (1944,
p. 101). As New Deal legislation piled up, Hofstadter wrote acidly, “the sons of the generation that applauded Spencer
witnessed the creation of a state machinery far greater than any that could have appeared in the Victorian individualist’s
worst nightmare” (1944, p. 102).
6. Hofstadter2: Darwinist individualism and Darwinist collectivism
SDATwasaverysuccessfulbook.DonaldBellomy,whosemeticuloussurveyofsocialDarwinism(anditshistoriography)is
exhaustive,calledSDAT“thesinglemostinﬂuentialworkonthesubject” (1984,p.6). Successnotwithstanding, SDAT’s legacy
is an ambiguous one. Hofstadter1 condemned free-market economics with the slur “social Darwinism” and, by opposing
economic reform to free-market economics, offered a tale “of heroic liberals snatching helpless social science from the
clutches of vile Social Darwinists” (Bellomy, 1984,p .1 8 ) .
But Hofstadter was too talented a scholar to neglect Darwinian and other evolutionary inﬂuences upon progressives.
Indeed Hofstadter2 documented that some of those heroic liberals promoted eugenics or scientiﬁc racism or imperialism.
As far as I can tell, Hofstadter never applied the epithet “social Darwinist” to a progressive, a practice that continues to this
day.18 However, Hofstadter2 recognized (what he saw as) the inﬂuence of Darwinist and other evolutionary ideas upon those
with collectivist views, enough to devise a term for the phenomenon, “Darwinist collectivism.”
When SDAT turned to the Progressive Era in its last two substantive chapters, the evidence of biological inﬂuence upon
reformers was impressive.19 Hofstadter acknowledged that Thorstein Veblen, if sui generis, was probably the most Darwinist
of all Progressive Era political economists (1992, pp. 152–156). He noted Wharton School reformer Simon Patten’s quasi-
eugenic attempt to integrate biology into political economy. He recognized that Richard T. Ely and the reform insurgents who
founded the American Economic Association in 1885 made Sumner their foil, but never on grounds that Sumner misapplied
Darwin. Sumner’s “social Darwinism” to the progressive economists consisted of opposition to reform.
Hofstadter,wehaveseen,acknowledgedLesterFrankWard’sdefenseofrace-conﬂicttheory.Hofstadter’schapter“Racism
and Imperialism” found progressive Theodore Roosevelt defending a hairy-chested brand of race-conscious imperialism.
16 Ward, The Psychic Factors of Civilization, pp. 134–35, cited in Hofstadter (1944, p. 62).
17 Hofstadter’s 1959 introduction to SDAT identiﬁed two key ideological commitments of “conservative” thought: “survival of the ﬁttest,” and gradualism,
the claim that “all sound development must be slow and unhurried” (1992, p. 7).
18 There are rare exceptions. One of SDAT’s reviews, for example, referred to “Veblen’s own brand of social Darwinism” (Bennett, 1945, p. 450).
19 I am using the term “biological” to describe Hofstadter’s inclusive characterization of the scholars and scientists in question, not their views as such.44 T.C. Leonard / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71 (2009) 37–51
Hofstadter acknowledged Social Gospeler and reformer Josiah Strong’s militant Anglo-Saxonism. He recorded that biologist
and Stanford University president David Starr Jordan, a leader of the American peace movement, protested against the First
World War on grounds the war was dysgenic: the ﬁttest men were killed, while the weaklings stayed home. Moreover,
Hofstadter in one place granted the appeal of eugenics to the progressive economist-turned-sociologist, Edward A. Ross.
Thus, however one judges Hofstadter1’s claim that free-market economics in the Gilded Age was Darwinist, and the
revisionist historiography has judged it harshly, Hofstadter2 found evolutionary justiﬁcations of eugenics, racism, and impe-
rialism made by progressives. In fact, said Hofstadter2, after 1890, “Darwinist collectivism” superseded the “Darwinist
individualism” of Spencer and Sumner, reﬂecting the Progressive Era’s new openness toward greater state involvement
in the economy and society.
7. The “Two-Hofstadters” legacies of SDAT
Both Hofstadters have had an impact, but in different ways and at different times. Hofstadter1, who attached the epithet
“social Darwinism” to the free-market views of Spencer and Sumner and who made progressive opposition to such “social
Darwinism” heroic, realized immediate and lasting inﬂuence. Not one of SDAT’s nineteen reviews published in JSTOR missed
the key Hofstadter1 innovation of calling laissez-faire “social Darwinism,” and few have since.
Hofstadter2,whorecognizedthatDarwinisminﬂuencedanextraordinaryrangeofideologicalviews,including“Darwinist
collectivism,” also started strong. Several of SDAT’s reviewers drew attention to the Hofstadter2 thesis that Darwinism was
a neutral instrument, “capable of supporting opposite ideologies” (1944, p. 174). Joseph Blau’s review even argued that
Hofstadter’s “most signiﬁcant point” was SDAT’s “recognition of dual sociological traditions stemming from Darwinism ...
Darwinian individualism he uses as a description of [a] type of conservative capitalist apologetics ...Darwinian collectivism
urgedcontrolofthesocialenvironmenttosubstituteconsciousevolutionfortheplayofnaturalforces”(1945,p.192).Cochran
(1945, p. 251) likewise noted “the ﬁnal irony that another group of ‘collectivists,’ translating the competitive struggle for
survival into national terms, made these theories, originally so heartening to the supporters of laissez-faire, into a sanction
for imperialism, racism and war.”
However some reviewers missed (or ignored) Hofstadter2’s claim that Darwinism was a protean doctrine with both
individualist and collectivist versions and instead seized upon Hofstadter1’s discrediting of free-market economics as social
Darwinism, and his depiction of progressive reform as opposed to social Darwinism. Montagu’s (1946, p. 146) review in Isis,
for example, offered a gloss that was pure Hofstadter1: it identiﬁed Spencer with Social Darwinism and argued that the
“gradual dissolution of Social Darwinism [came] through the agency of its principal critics,” where Ward and the progressive
reformerswerethe“critics.”MontaguignoredHofstadter2’s(1944,p.174)accountofhow“Darwinianindividualismdeclined,
[while] Darwinian collectivism of the nationalist or racist kind was beginning to take hold”.
Loewenberg’s (1945, p. 821) review conﬂated the two Hofstadters. Though Loewenberg recognized something like
Hofstadter2’s insight into the varieties of Darwinism, individualist (Sumner), and collectivist (Ward), he then proceeded
to ride roughshod over the distinction in favor of the Hofstadter1 technique of derogating Spencer and Sumner, however
inaccurately. In particular, Loewenberg suggested that “American imperialist and racist ideologies” were the product of indi-
vidualist Darwinism, not, as Hofstadter2 had it, of collectivist Darwinism. Princeton’s David F. Bowers likewise elided SDAT’s
distinctionbetweenindividualistandcollectivistDarwinism,saying“Spencer’sbiologicalapproachtosocialtheoryprovided
support for the biological approach to history implicit in all racist and imperialist propaganda” (1945, p. 104).
Of course, both Spencer and Sumner vigorously opposed imperialism, as might reasonably be expected of two leading
exponents of limited government. In Social Statics, Spencer scorned English attempts to “justify our colonial aggressions by
saying that the Creator intends the Anglo-Saxon race to people the world” (1851, p. 142). He condemned the “piratical spirit”
of imperialism and insisted that “territorial aggression is as impolitic as it is unjust” (1851, p. 322). Sumner, for his part,
openly criticized the Spanish-American War, saying that “my patriotism is of the kind which is outraged by the notion that
the United States was never a great nation until [this] ...petty three months campaign” (Sumner 1911b,p .3 3 4 ) . 20
Bowers, again running together Hofstadter2’s distinction between individualist and collectivist Darwinism, even claimed
to ﬁnd in SDAT “[Herbert Spencer’s] ...important inﬂuence on the eugenics movement of the period”(1945, p. 104). It would
seem a stretch to claim that Herbert Spencer advocated planned state control of human breeding, but that charge emerged
immediately in the wake of SDAT and can still be found today.21
From the beginning, then, though virtually none of SDAT’s readers missed Hofstadter1, some have missed or ignored
Hofstader2. In some sense this is reconstructable: the ideas of Hofstadter2 were, in SDAT, undeveloped relative to those of
Hofstadter1. Thus could historian of science William Coleman say, writing in 1966, “the two Darwinisms have yet to ﬁnd
their historian.” Hofstadter’s SDAT, Coleman judged, reviewed only individualist Darwinism in depth (1966, p. 33).
20 When Hofstadter brieﬂy notes Sumner’s opposition to American expansion, he quips that “those who were familiar with Sumner’s crisp iconoclasm
on ... democracy may have rubbed their eyes to see the intransigent schoolmaster attack imperialists for preparing the abandonment of the nation’s
democratic principles” (1992, p. 195). Hofstadter’s quip is more than a cheap shot; it is an admission that his taxonomy could not accommodate a classically
liberal opposition to the expansion of state power.
21 Thurow (1997, p. 249) proposed, for example, “Spencer created the eugenics movement to stop the unﬁt from reproducing” [emphasis added]. Even
more scholarly writers have repeated the canard that Spencer was a eugenicist; see Black (2003).T.C. Leonard / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71 (2009) 37–51 45
Post-SDAT historians, following Goldman (1952), would refer to the progressives’ use of Darwin as reform Darwinism,t o
be contrasted with conservative Darwinism. Goldman coined new terms in order to designate more clearly the distinction
Hofstadter2 made between ideological uses of Darwin in support of reform from those in support of free markets. In some
respects,Goldman’snomenclatureisatipofthecaptoHofstadter2,butthatGoldmanfeltcompelledtocoinnewterminology
suggests that Hofstadter2’s terms, “Darwinian individualism” and “Darwinian collectivism,” did not acquire much currency,
as indeed they did not.
Measured by terminological citation in JSTOR, Hofstadter1 has buried Hofstadter2. The term “social Darwinism,” which
Hofstadter (in the guise of Hofstadter1) reserved for those he wished to disparage, including Spencer and Sumner, acquired
enormous currency after the publication of SDAT. “Social Darwinism,” is cited 4236 times from 1944 to the present, and
fully one-third of these citations also mention Spencer and/or Sumner. Hofstadter2, measured by terminological usage, left
no mark whatsoever. The terms Hofstadter2 employed, “Darwinian collectivism” and “Darwinian individualism,” appear a
scant fourteen times from 1944 to the present, and eight of these occurred in the reviews of SDAT.22 Hoftstadter himself, in
his 1959 introduction to SDAT, opted to forgo his earlier terms, “Darwinian collectivism” and “Darwinian individualism.”23
Painting with a broad brush, we can identify three legacies of SDAT. First is Hofstadter1’s association of social Darwinism
with free-market economics, that is, with economic competition and individualism. Hofstadter’s most inﬂuential SDAT
innovation, tarring laissez-faire with “social Darwinism,” has proven especially durable and salient. Post-SDAT, fully one-
third of the 4236 JSTOR articles and reviews containing “social Darwinism” also mention Herbert Spencer and/or William
GrahamSumner.24 BeforeHofstadter,SpencerandSumnerwererarely,ifever,knownassocialDarwinists.25 AfterHofstadter,
the two men were transformed into arch-social Darwinists.
This legacy, the Hofstadter1 legacy, made Spencer and Sumner into social Darwinists. In extreme form, its interpreters
treat Spencer and Sumner as the only social Darwinists, a view that required ignoring or dismissing the Hofstadter2 of SDAT.
When,forexample,Tanenhaus(2006)reviewedDavidS.Brown’sHofstadterbiographyintheNewYorkTimes,hesummarized
SDAT as follows: a “discourse on 19th-century social scientists like Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner, who had
debased the theory of natural selection into high-minded apologetics for Gilded Age rapacity, with help from the racially
tinged speculations in Darwin’s own ‘Descent of Man.”’ Score one for Hofstader1.
SDAT’s second legacy arises from the connection between what Bellomy calls the “conceptual elasticity” of “social Dar-
winism,” the decline of Hofstadter2’s distinction between individualist Darwinism (laissez-faire) and collectivist Darwinism
(racism, imperialism and eugenics), and the historically pejorative connotations of “social Darwinism.”
It is the case that SDAT give impetus to the novel association of social Darwinism not only with laissez-faire, but also with
racism (in addition to the earlier senses of war and imperialism). With the terminological atrophy of the conceptual distinc-
tionsHofstadter2 madebetweensuchdiversephenomenaaslaissez-faire,racism,imperialismandeugenics,therehasbeena
tendency, enforced by “social Darwinism’s” long history as a slur, to depict all these phenomena in common, as Bad Things.26
Never mind that the set of Gilded Age and Progressive Era writers who endorsed laissez-faire, racism, imperialism,
and eugenics is essentially empty, making their putative commonality historically vacuous. When viewed retrospectively,
“social Darwinism” functions as a synecdoche for all that an early-1940s New Deal liberal (and many since) would regard as
retrograde and reactionary. Despite the efforts of Hofstadter2, who showed that some of what looked reactionary to mid-
20th century liberal eyes was called progressive 40 years earlier, this retrospective lumping together of historically diverse
phenomena is also a legacy of SDAT.
If Hofstadter2’s name for collectivist Darwinism did not survive, his association of Darwinism with collective phenomena
such as eugenics, racism, and imperialism did. Later historians took up the story of “collectivist Darwinism,” especially the
inﬂuence of eugenics upon Anglo-American social thought. In spite of the fact, or perhaps because of the fact that eugenics
is, in important respects, non-Darwinian, this too is a (third) legacy of SDAT, the one that took longest to manifest.
8. SDAT on eugenics
Hofstadter’s discussion of eugenics in SDAT is brief and incomplete. “Eugenics” did not even earn a place in SDAT’s index,
butitisnonethelessimportant.First,itwasunusualforamid-20thcenturyvolumeprimarilyconcernedwithProgressiveEra
reform even to acknowledge eugenic inﬂuences on American thought. After the atrocities of the German National Socialists
22 Search of “Darwinian individualism,” “Darwinian collectivism,” “collectivist Darwinism” or “individualist Darwinism,” from 1944 to 12 June 2007. The
search space was 2.3 million articles and reviews.
23 Hofstadter in 1959 did not abandon the SDAT concept that there were individualist and collectivist forms of Darwinism, but while still associating social
Darwinism with “laissez-faire conservatives,” he abandoned the term “collectivist Darwinism” in favor of the more ambiguous “critics of social Darwinism”
(1992, pp. 5–6).
24 A case-insensitive search (including plural forms) of “social Darwinist,” “social Darwinism” and “social Darwinian,” from 1944 to 12 June 2007, yielded
4236 hits. Of these, 1416 included a reference to Spencer or Sumner or both. The search space was 2.3 million articles and reviews.
25 Hodgson (2004) makes a similar point, but dates the change to the 1930s.
26 A recent front-page New York Times article provides a current example of the Bad-Things conﬂation. Reporter Cohen (2007) wrote, “Victorian-era social
Darwinists like Herbert Spencer adopted evolutionary theory to justify colonialism and imperialism, opposition to labor unions and the withdrawal of
aid to the sick and needy.” The Times was obliged to run a correction 1 week later. It read, “A front-page article last Saturday about a dispute among
some conservatives over whether Darwinian theory undermines or supports conservative principles erroneously included one social Darwinist among
Victorian-era social Darwinists who adopted evolutionary theory to justify colonialism and imperialism. Herbert Spencer opposed both.”46 T.C. Leonard / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71 (2009) 37–51
were exposed, “eugenics” became (and still is) a dirty word. Second, Hofstadter’s discussion, however perfunctory, exem-
pliﬁed the SDAT tension between its two desiderata: economic reform is better than laissez-faire, and cultural explanations
are better than biological explanations in social science. For Progressive Era eugenics, the planned social control of human
heredity, was, at once, reformist and biological.
ThistensionledHofstadterinsometimesopposeddirections.Eugenics,saidHofstadter,wasjustsocialDarwinism“decked
out in a somewhat new guise” (1944, p. 138). Hofstadter1 thus tended to treat eugenics and social Darwinism monolithi-
cally, both “fundamentally conservative” and instances of reactionary apologetics for the social order. However, Hofstadter2
recognized that “the eugenics craze had about it the air of ‘a reform”’; eugenics, Hofstadter2 pointed out, “failed to draw
sweeping laissez-faire conclusions,” and it “accepted the principle of state action toward a common end, and spoke in terms
of the collective destiny of a group rather than individual success” (1944, pp. 140, 144). Though Hofstadter did not pursue
the connection he made between progressivism and eugenics, later historians did (Pickens, 1968; Paul, 1984).
We now know that eugenics was popular, widespread and respectable among American progressive economists and their
allies during the Progressive Era (Leonard, 2003, 2005). A Who’s Who of progressive American labor reform, for example,
argued that the biological inﬁrmities of immigrants, blacks, women, and mental and moral defectives caused low wages,
justifying their removal (or exclusion) from the labor force.27 This line of research, too, can be seen as a partial legacy of SDAT.
As much as Hofstadter2 recognized the collectivist and statist elements of eugenics, and thereby its reform aspect,
Hofstadter1 was still working with the schema that made reform the opposite pole of social Darwinism. This ambivalence
is manifest throughout SDAT’s eugenics discussion. While Hofstadter1 dismissed eugenics as so much “social Darwinism,”
Hofstadter2 recorded an important historical difference between eugenics and social Darwinism. For, recall, SDAT declared
social Darwinism dead during World War I, but maintained that eugenics was alive and well, reaching, circa 1915, the pro-
portions of a fad. Whether or not it was the reform elements of American eugenics that sustained it past the death of
social Darwinism, Hofstadter is here simultaneously identifying eugenics with social Darwinism while insisting upon their
differences.
SDAT noted Lester Frank Ward’s criticism of Francis Galton, who is conventionally identiﬁed as the father of modern
eugenics, but Ward’s attack was upon Galton’s neo-Darwinian hereditarianism, not eugenics as such, a distinction that
Hofstadter elides. Indeed Ward (1891) once ﬂirted with eugenic ideas, and a number of progressive eugenicists were, like
Ward, Lamarckians.
HofstadtercitedOliverWendellHolmes’famousdissentinglineinLochnerv.NewYork(1905),that“thefourteenthamend-
ment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,” as evidence of progressive opposition to the beneﬁcial selective
effects of economic competition (1944, p. 465), but Hofstadter neglected the inconvenient fact that Holmes himself was a
partisan of selection, a eugenicist who later conﬁded to Harold Laski that “in upholding the constitutionality of a state law
upholding for sterilizing imbeciles ...[I] felt I was getting near to the ﬁrst principle of real reform” (in Degler, 1991,p .4 7 ) . 28
HofstadtercalleduponChicagosociologistandreformerCharlesHendersontotestifytothesocialDarwinismofGildedAge
businessmendefendinglaissez-faire(apointmadebyWyllie,1959).HeneglectedtonoteHenderson’seugenicistcredentials.
Henderson (1909) opposed immigration of the “unﬁt” and proposed that the “feebleminded and degenerate” (of whatever
nationality) be banished to rural labor colonies. “It is clearly and distinctly the right of a commonwealth,” argued Henderson
(1909, pp. 228–229), “to deprive [the unﬁt] of liberty and so prevent their propagation of defects and thus the perpetuation
of their misery in their offspring. Therefore the policy of painless asexualization is offered ....”
Hofstadter characterized American opposition to immigration generally in nativist terms, a group he did not in SDAT
associate with reform: “The inﬂux of a large immigrant population from peasant countries of central and southern Europe,
hard to assimilate because of rustic habits and language barriers, gave color to the notion that immigration was lowering the
standard of American intelligence,” Hofstadter (1944, p. 139) wrote, “so at least it seemed to nativists who assumed that a
glib command of English is a natural criterion of intellectual capacity”. Hofstadter neglected the fact that it was a progressive
economist, Edward Bemis (1888), who devised the idea of a literacy test to exclude racially undesirable immigrants.
Indeed from SDAT one would know almost nothing of the leading role played by progressive economists (and other
reformers) in advocating eugenically motivated immigration and labor legislation. In Races and Immigrants, the University
of Wisconsin economist and social reformer John R. Commons argued that immigrant labor competition selects for the unﬁt
races; “The competition has no respect for the superior races,” said Commons (1907, p. 151), and “the race with lowest neces-
sities displaces others.”29 Wharton School reformer Nearing (1915, p. 22) volunteered that if “an employer has a Scotchman
27 Beatrice and Sidney Webbs’ taxonomy of the unﬁt included “Children, the aged, and the child-bearing women ...the sick and the crippled, the idiots
and lunatics, the epileptic, the blind and the deaf and dumb, the criminals and the incorrigibly idle, and all those who are actually ‘morally deﬁcient’ ...
and [those] incapable of steady or continuous application, or who are so deﬁcient in strength, speed or skill that they are incapable of producing their
maintenance at any occupation whatsoever” (Webb and Webb, 1920 [1897], p. 785).
28 Holmes wrote in Buck v. Bell: “We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it
could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacriﬁces ...in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence”
274 US 207 (1927).
29 Because race rather than productivity determined living standards, Commons could populate his low-wage-races category with the industrious and
lazy alike. African-Americans were, for Commons (1907, p. 136), “indolent and ﬁckle,” which explained why, Commons argued, slavery was required: “The
negro could not possibly have found a place in American industry had he come as a free man ...[I]f such races are to adopt that industrious life which is
second nature to races of the temperate zones, it is only through some form of compulsion.”T.C. Leonard / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71 (2009) 37–51 47
working for him at $3 a day [and] an equally efﬁcient Lithuanian offers to the same work for $2 ...the work is given to the
low bidder.”
Royal Meeker, Woodrow Wilson’s U.S. Commissioner of Labor, opposed subsidies to the wages of poor workers. Meeker
preferredaminimumwagebecauseitwoulddisemployunﬁtworkersandtherebyfacilitatetheircullingfromtheworkforce.
“It is much better to enact a minimum-wage law even if it deprives these unfortunates of work,” argued Meeker. “Better that
the state should support the inefﬁcient wholly and prevent the multiplication of the breed than subsidize incompetence and
unthrift, enabling them to bring forth more of their kind” (1910, p. 554).
Columbia University progressive Henry Seager (1913, p. 9) wrote, “The operation of the minimum wage requirement
would merely extend the deﬁnition of defectives to embrace all individuals, who even after having received special training,
remain incapable of adequate self-support.” Seager (1913, p. 10) made clear what should happen to those who, even after
remedialtraining,couldnotearnthelegalminimum:“Ifwearetomaintainaracethatistobemadeofupofcapable,efﬁcient
and independent individuals and family groups we must courageously cut off lines of heredity that have been proved to be
undesirable by isolation or sterilization.”
In these cases, it seems that Hofstadter1 trumped Hofstadter2. In one instance, however, the case of Edward A. Ross,
both Hofstadters appear within four pages of one another. Speaking of Ross and fellow sociologist Charles Horton Cooley,
Hofstadter1 opined,“menlikeCooleyandRossrefusedtolookuponthepoorasunﬁtortoworshipattheshrineoftheﬁttest”
(1992, p. 160). This was nonsense. Ross, especially, was quite happy to worship at the shrine of ﬁttest, provided the ﬁttest
were selected by state experts.
It was Ross who had coined the term “race suicide,” a Progressive Era catchphrase for the process by which racially
superior stock (Yankee natives) is outbred by a more proliﬁc, but inferior stock (immigrants). In Ross’s view, the racially
inferiorimmigrantraces,“Latins,Slavs,Asiatics,andHebrews,”werebetteradaptedtotheconditionsofindustrialcapitalism
and thus would outbreed the superior Anglo-Saxon race (1901b). Thereby, Ross volunteered, “the higher race quietly and
unmurmuringly eliminates itself rather than endure individually the bitter competition it has failed to ward off by collective
action” (1901a, p. 88).30 Cooley, for his part, went so far as to suggest that the unﬁt endanger society “in a manner analogous
to that in which the presence of inferior cattle in a herd endangers the biological type” (1909, p. 296).31
Hofstadter2, however, knew that Ross was a particularly outspoken advocate of race-based immigration restriction and
recognizedthatRoss’spositionwaspremisedontheclaimthatsomegroupsamongthepoorareunﬁt.Thus,amerefourpages
after insisting that Ross did not worship at the shrine of the ﬁttest, Hofstadter (in the guise of Hofstadter2) acknowledged
that the eugenicists’ “biological data ...were convincing to men like E.A. Ross, who had thoroughly repudiated Spencerian
individualism” (1992, p. 64).
Hofstadter’sambivalenceisclear.RosswasaleadingprogressivewhosereformadvocacySDAT(intheformofHofstadter1)
had depicted as opposed to survival of the ﬁttest dogma because reform is opposed to “Spencerian individualism.” However,
Ross, at the same time, promoted a racist form of eugenics, what Hofstadter2 called “collectivist Darwinism.”
In the end, Hofstadter2 took some important preliminary steps. He recognized that eugenics was a collectivist doctrine,
thatitrejectedindividualisminfavorofaraceorclassorstratumofintelligence.Hofstadter2 alsorecognizedthatProgressive
Era eugenics was statist, that it opposed laissez-faire values by substituting an objective, expert determination of the social
good for a subjective, individual determination of the social good. Laissez-faire eugenics, as Sidney Webb had boasted, was,
in the Progressive Era, a contradiction in terms.32 Nonetheless, Hofstadter1, who had portrayed reform as the polar opposite
of social Darwinism (as laissez-faire), carried the day in this part of SDAT: it does not discuss or even identify the many
inﬂuential reformers who were drawn to eugenic explanations of social and economic life.33
9. “Tarring Darwin with a Malthusian Brush”34
It is a commonplace among Left scholars in the Darwin industry to argue that Darwin himself was a social Darwinist
from the beginning. Not only is the Darwin of the Descent of Man a social Darwinist, but so too is the Darwin of The Origin
of Species, which contains no references to homo sapiens. Marxist historian Robert Young (1982) so argues in “Darwinism Is
Social” and in other places; and biologist Richard Lewontin (1990) claims for the critique the status of “received doctrine”
among historians.
The argument goes as follows. Darwin, say these critics, cannot be represented, as internalist histories too often do, as
a naive naturalist, somehow unaware of or unconcerned with the political and economic events of his day. Darwin was,
rather, a well-read Victorian sophisticate, acquainted with Malthus, Adam Smith, and Adam Ferguson (Schweber, 1977).
Indeed, when properly interpreted, Darwin’s theory of natural selection should be seen as laden with Malthusian values,
30 Morethan40yearsaftertheAmericanCivilWar,Ross(1907,p.715)wrote,“Thetheorythatracesarevirtuallyequalincapacityleadstosuchmonumental
follies as lining the valleys of the South with the bones of half a million picked whites in order to improve the conditions of four million unpicked blacks.”
31 On Cooley and eugenics, see McCann (2009).
32 Said Webb (1910–1911, p. 237) ﬂatly, “[N]o consistent eugenicist can be a ‘Laisser Faire’ individualist unless he throws up the game in despair. He must
interfere, interfere, interfere!”
33 There were many other Progressive Era reformers who endorsed the eugenic virtues of exclusionary labor and immigration legislation. See Leonard
(2003).
34 I owe this phrase to Donald Winch (2001).48 T.C. Leonard / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71 (2009) 37–51
enough that The Origin of Species should be read as capitalist apologetic, an attempt to lend laissez-faire orthodoxy the
imprimaturs of “natural” and of “science.” “Darwin,” say Adrian Desmond and James Moore, “plac[ed] Nature on industry’s
side” (1991, p. 421). The theory of organic evolution by natural selection, goes the critique, should be seen a simple projection
onto nature of Malthusian political economy, the kind that justiﬁed capitalist travesties such as the English Poor Law of
1834.
The notion that Darwinism is just an apology for Malthusian political economy has a long pedigree in radical thought;
Marx and Engels both made remarks in this vein. Hofstadter in SDAT is on, well, both sides of the matter.
On the one hand, Hofstadter (in the guise of Hofstadter2) defended what the Darwin-as-Malthusian-apologist view
denies, that “intrinsically, [Darwinism] was a neutral instrument, capable of supporting opposite ideologies”; “Kropotkin’s
interpretation,” said Hofstadter2, “was as logical as Sumner’s” (1944, p. 174).
On the other hand, Hofstadter offered support to the Darwin-as-Malthusian-apologist view when (in the guise of
Hofstadter1) he tried to explain the lack of Darwinism in late 19th-century orthodox (read: laissez-faire) American political
economy. Why is it, SDAT asks, that economists such as J. Lawrence Laughlin and Arthur Latham Perry show no trace of
Darwin? How to explain the “failure of orthodox economists to embrace social Darwinism as preached by Sumner.” After
all, Hofstadter1 volunteered, Darwinism was “so obviously adapted to the function of their [economics] discipline as they
conceive it.” (1944, p. 122).
TheHofstadter1 answerwasthateconomicsdidnotneedDarwinismbecause“italreadyhaditsowndoctrineofselection.”
In fact, said Hofstadter1, it was classical political economy that inﬂuenced the theorists of organic evolution rather than the
other way around. The theorists of organic evolution (Spencer, Darwin and Wallace), Hofstadter continued, were led by
Malthusian political economy to their evolutionary theories, enough that economists might well be justiﬁed in “proclaiming
that biology had merely universalized a truth which had been in their possession for a long time” (1944, p. 122). Why should
classically inclined economists ever cite Charles Darwin when Darwin’s debt to classical political economy, especially to
Malthus, was evidently so great that no citation was ever needed? If there was no Darwin in Laughlin and Perry and their
ilk, well, that was because Laughlin and Perry were already in Darwin.
Nevermindthatthisanalysisassumedwhatneededtobeshown.ThisisanotherinstanceofHofstadterianambivalencein
SDAT, with an ensuing ambiguous legacy: Hofstadter2 depicted Darwinism as a neutral instrument, usable for any ideology,
while Hofstadter1 depicted Darwinism as all but the necessary product of Malthusian political economy. Hofstadter1 proved
compatible with the Marxian reading of Darwin, but Hofstadter2 did not.
What of the merits of the charge made by Hofstadter (in the guise of Hofstadter1) and later historians of the Left? We can
agree that science is social and, further, that the historical Darwin was indeed inﬂuenced by Malthus’ population theory. It is
also true that evolutionary thought antedated the publication of the Origin in 1859 and that this pre-Darwinian evolutionary
theory was as concerned (if not more so) with social as with organic evolution. As a methodological injunction, “assume
science is social” seems a prudent one.
But does accepting the general position that science is social, and the more speciﬁc claim that Darwin was no naïf,
oblige us to accept the very speciﬁc historical claim that the theory of evolution by natural selection is just Malthu-
sian apologetics? The answer, I think, is “no.” In this I concur with Darwinism scholar Paul Crook: that Darwinism
has partial origins in social thought and has been appropriated for ideological uses does not establish the Marxian
claim that Darwin has been appropriated uniquely in defense of “Malthusianism,” a.k.a. laissez-faire orthodoxy (Crook,
1996).
There are three difﬁculties for the Marxian reading of the Origin as warmed-over Malthusian political economy.35 First,
with respect to consequences, Darwin has found exegetes of virtually all ideologies: laissez-faire and socialist, individ-
ualist and communist, militarist and paciﬁst, pro-natalist and neo-Malthusian, religious and agnostic (Jones, 1998,p .7 ) .
Leading eugenicist Karl Pearson (1894) found a case for socialism in Darwin, as did Alfred Russel Wallace. Russian aristo-
crat and anarchist Peter Kropotkin found cooperation not conﬂict in natural selection, explained in his Mutual Aid (1902).
Darwin himself seems to have been pro-natalist, while neo-Malthusian Margaret Sanger, who coined the term “birth con-
trol,” embraced eugenics.36 Darwin’s “bulldog,” T.H. Huxley, thought natural selection suggested agnosticism (he coined
the term), while the American Protestant Social Gospelers happily assimilated Darwin to their evangelical reform purposes.
It is a tribute to the protean qualities of Darwinism, as Crook points out, that Darwinism could even be assimilated into
“traditional value systems, theodicies and moral philosophies ...that on the whole spurned stark survivor ethics” (1996, p.
268).
The second difﬁculty is that if Darwin intended the theory of evolution by natural selection to shore up Malthusianism,
the co-founder of the theory of evolution by natural selection, Alfred Russel Wallace, must have intended it to tear down
Malthusianism. For as William Coleman has persuasively argued, the co-founder of natural selection, Alfred R. Wallace,
was a socialist who wrote on political economy and who actively opposed competition, free trade, usury, and exports; who
championed minimum wages, land nationalization, free bread for the indigent; and who argued that “capital” was “the
enemy and tyrant of labour” (2001, p. 39).
35 See Bowler (1976) for a view that Malthus and Darwin had very different conceptions of struggle, with Malthus emphasizing the struggle between man
and environment while still imagining a natural harmony within society and Darwin adding the idea of intra-species struggle.
36 On Darwin’s private view of birth control, this during the famous Bradlaugh-Besant trial, see Peart and Levy (2005).T.C. Leonard / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71 (2009) 37–51 49
Wallace was to his death a stout defender of Darwin and of their theory of natural selection.37 If political economy
determined the theory of natural selection, then, in the case of co-discoverer Wallace, the economic wellspring cannot be
Malthus’ political economy, but is instead an idiosyncratic blend of radical Owenite political economy and mysticism. Even
if it were true that natural selection was devised to apologize for a particular conception of the right economic order, the
example of Wallace shows that Owenite socialism is as likely a source as Malthusianism.
A third and related point, as Winch (2001) has argued, is that the Marxian reading of the Origin has tended to inﬂate
Malthus’ Essay on Population into what it calls “Malthusianism.” However it was Malthus’ population theory that inﬂuenced
Darwin, and population theory should not be identiﬁed with “Malthusianism,” an imprecise rubric used by the proponents
of the Darwin-as-Malthusian-apologist thesis to cover to a whole host of laissez-faire ideas they associate with orthodox
British political economy during the years of the Origin’s gestation.
Winch argues that there was no such orthodoxy, Malthusian or other: “political economists were no more united than
biologists were during this period; they came in different shapes and sizes and were divided among various theoretical,
political and methodological lines. Conclusions and attitudes, therefore, cannot be ascribed to the tribe as a whole” (2001,
p. 418). Moreover, even Malthus in isolation does not merit the various charges ascribed to “Malthusianism.” When the Poor
Laws were amended in 1834 (the year of Malthus’s death), this was said to be “Malthusian,” but Malthus had ceased to
support the change; the author of new legislation, Nassau Senior, made no mention of Malthus’ population principle and,
indeed, regarded it as already obsolete. Nor was Malthus a “Malthusian” in the sense of being, per Desmond and Moore, “a
Whig free trader’s godsend” (Winch, 2001, p. 426). Winch reminds us that Malthus was, in fact, a conspicuous supporter of
protection of agriculture, was skeptical about the merits of substituting manufacturing for agriculture, and was lukewarm
at best toward emigration (2001, p. 426). In short, the Malthus who inﬂuenced Darwin was not “Malthusian” in the sense
intended by those who read the Origin as apology for Malthusianism.
SDAT’s ambiguity on the matter, Hofstadter2 depicting Darwinism as a neutral instrument, usable for any ideology and
Hofstadter1 depicting Darwinism as intrinsically Malthusian—presaged some modern treatments. Mike Hawkins’ (1997)
book on social Darwinism, for example, follows the lead of Hofstadter2 by documenting the extraordinary diversity of ide-
ologies that have located support in Darwinism. Hawkins writes, for example, that “Darwinism was enlisted by protagonists
on all sides of these debates,” including, among the “reform Darwinists,” “Marxist revolutionaries through to democratic
socialists, and new Liberals [and] also ... anarchists” (1997, p. 141), but then, channeling Hofstadter1, he concludes that
reform uses of Darwin, uses congenial to Hawkins’ politics, are not “social Darwinism” proper. Hawkins thus decides, con-
trary to his own evidence, that the epithet “social Darwinism” is rightfully applied only to Hoftstadter1’s old bugaboo:
individualist Darwinism.
10. Conclusion
SDATgaveimpetustotwomostlyopposedhistoriographictrends.First,HofstadterinSDATsucceededbrilliantlyinafﬁxing
the epithet “social Darwinism” to free-market economics. His many revisionists notwithstanding, SDAT’s most conspicuous
and enduring legacy is its discrediting of Spencer and Sumner with “social Darwinism.” Never mind that neither were
especially Darwinist, and never mind that Hofstadter also found Darwinism in reform. In the popular and scholarly mind,
Spencer and Sumner are social Darwinism.
Second, Hofstadter’s investigations into eugenics, racism and imperialism among progressives, however preliminary,
presaged, with a long delay, the revisionist literature that has debunked the hagiographic portrayal of American Progressive
Era reformers that existed prior to SDAT,38 and, with it, the progressives’ faith in statism and expertise. The literature now
recognizesanextremelybroadandideologicallydiversesetofsocialthinkersinﬂuencedbyDarwinianandotherevolutionary
ideas. Hofstadter in SDAT may have soft-pedaled progressive support for eugenics, racism, and American expansion during
the Progressive Era, but he did not ignore it either, and that was innovative in American historical writing of the time.
Work such as Hawkins (1997) are perhaps SDAT’s perhaps most direct legacy because they contain both historiographic
traditions given impetus by SDAT, however opposed the two traditions would seem to be. These treatments acknowledge
whatisnowacommonplace,thegreatideologicaldiversityofsocialandeconomicthoughtinﬂuencedbyDarwinianandother
evolutionary ideas, but they atavistically condemn as “social Darwinist” only one strain thereof, the one that defends indi-
vidualism and free markets. In a multigenerational echo of SDAT, they, like Hofstadter2, ﬁnd Darwinism almost everywhere
in social thought, but, also like Hofstadter1, they still condemn as “social Darwinists” only Spencer and Sumner.
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